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Notes on [REDACTED] Lecture Concerning
The Mission of the Clandestine Services

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1. [REDACTED], Senior Planning Officer of the DD(P), described the status of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in government before the Clandestine Services Review class on 27 September 1960. During the past six months CIA has been identified with several incidents, including the shooting-down of the U-2 and apprehension of agents, that could be characterized as serious blows to the prestige of the Agency. They have involved CIA in publicity, compromise, and loss of assets. The consequences could have been grave -- impairment of CIA's standing in the government, loss of respect and confidence of sister agencies, and the lowering of morale of CIA personnel. The first two fears have not been realized, [REDACTED] said, because times have changed. Six years ago a U-2 incident would have resulted in hysteria within CIA and in all government agencies. CIA's position was insecure and its organization shaky. But the Agency has come of age and its initial faults have been corrected to a large degree. Congress has confidence in CIA; relations with the press are satisfactory, and responsible members of the press respect the confidence of senior CIA officials with whom they are in contact; all CIA activities are well coordinated with other members of the community; and firm and friendly relations have been established with leading figures in business, industry, banking, and education.

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2. [REDACTED] has been acting for the Director of CIA on the Sprague Committee. He said the committee was set up to examine all U.S. activities that cause government or popular reaction abroad. These range from tourist and troop behavior to the satellite program. Other members of the committee are the publisher of Life magazine, the Chairman of the Board of General Electric, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, and the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Gordon Gray. The Committee's report, which will call for an increase in psychological warfare activities, is in draft and will probably be presented to the President after elections.

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3. The major issues facing the U.S. in which CIA will play a major role were set forth recently by Mr. Livingston Merchant of the Department of State. [REDACTED] repeated them and gave his version of CIA's participation.

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- a. Soviet military threat. Six months ago the emphasis was probably greater than it is now because of recent United Nations (UN) developments. Even at the height of the Camp David era, no one believed the Kremlin had lost its revolutionary spirit. [REDACTED] 1A9a cited [REDACTED] remark that we are all in agreement that Khrushchev does not want war, but will he refrain from doing things that lead to war? In terms of CIA, the implications of the problem are obvious.

- b. Soviet military capabilities. This entire sphere is a priority commission of CIA, with highest priority on the deployment of guided missile sites. There has been no startling success. The targets are there but the U-2 is not. Other technical developments will gradually replace the U-2, but a satellite taking pictures over the Soviet Union presents staggering problems to analysts and experts faced with the task of organizing and analyzing the product. There will be a need for guidance and direction on where to go, where to look, and what to look for that can only be accomplished by penetration.
- c. Soviet intentions. This problem can only be solved by information from the Soviets themselves. The most fashionable collection problem at the moment is the attempt to get a copy of Khrushchev's speech at Bucharest.
- d. Possibility of favorable developments in the Soviet Union itself. Do revolutionary elements exist? Are revolutionary developments possible and, if so, what can we do to promote them? How much the Soviets have enlisted and gained the support of the population is obscure. One school of thought believes they have had considerable success in developing support and that rapid scientific development and improved living standards have impressed the population. On the other hand, there are the facts of the riots at Kazakstan, the appointment of five party secretaries within four years, and the inability to cope with the agricultural problem. Intellectual ferment is a real factor in this issue. [REDACTED] quoted from 25X1A9a letter of Boris Pasternak written just before his death, in which he warned his friends abroad not to upset the [Soviet] applecart. This is the kind of problem that cannot be solved by even the most advanced scientific and technical developments. The information needed can only be gathered by person-to-person contacts, and CIA should be able to play a major role here.
- e. The Soviet-Chinese rift. This is of immediate and great concern to CIA. An agency committee appointed last year to monitor activities in this sphere petered out but has been revitalized recently.
- f. The rifts and cleavages within NATO.
- g. The divided countries. [REDACTED] all constitute a threat to military ability.
- h. Governments maintaining friendly relations with the United States but who are, [REDACTED] said, "Keeping in with the outs without getting out with the ins." He mentioned [REDACTED] 25X1C10b said this was essentially a covert problem.

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- i. The problem of conflicting sympathies with some members of NATO and their emerging former colonies. CIA's role vis-a-vis the [REDACTED] is obscure; perhaps CIA should assume the role of mediator.
 - j. Underdeveloped areas notably Africa. The role here is primarily one of reconnaissance to discover who's who and what's what. Background information is sadly lacking on up-and-coming young Africans. Only a few weeks ago a Joseph Mobutu was known only to a devoted student of African politics, if indeed he was known at all. These gaps in information on the emerging African colonies, their leaders, political movements, and military, should be filled as rapidly as possible.
 - k. Policy of the United States toward the United Nations. Since Khrushchev's attack on Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, the United States has declared that all out support to the United Nations is the only solution to world order. The alternative to UN world order is Communist world order. The role of CIA in this issue could develop in a number of ways.
 - l. The parochial problem of U.S. internal security.

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4. [REDACTED] concluded that all this adds up to a substantial mission. The question is, is it too much, is it too diffuse, are we going about it the right way? Whatever the answer, no one can say it is unexciting or not worth doing.